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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the origins and development of 
the medical care program of the United Mine Workers 
of America Welfare and Retirement Fund. This pro­
gram was unique In the history of health care organ­
Ization in the United States In that Its policies and 
practices represented a departure from the dominant 
mode of organizing and financing health care. From 
1948 to 1978 it was viewed by many as a model for a 
national health service as opposed to a national health 
Insurance program. The purpose of this article Is to 
analyze the origins of the Fund medical care program 
and the early development of Its policies. The history 
of the program contains important lessons concern­
Ing the politics of health care In the United States and 
the relationship between who controls the provision 
of health care services and the cost and the quality of 
those services. 
Introduction 
From 1948 to 1978, the medical care program of the United 
Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund 
was the largest industry-wide, self-administered and com­
prehensive medical care program in the United States. It 
was viewed by many as a model for a nationaL health 
service. Unlike negotiated health benefit plans utilizing 
private insurance carriers, the Fund medical program de­
veloped health resources where they were needed, ar­
ranged for its beneficiaries to receive the services they 
required, and introduced measures to control the quality 
and the cost of medical care. Some members of the Fund 
medical staff who had supported a national health care 
program since the 1940s believed that the successful 
approaches they were developing to some of the basic 
problems in health care organization and financing could 
be applied on a national basis. They felt they had devised 
workable solutions to the problems of (1) getting health 
care resources to underserved areas, (2) recruiting and 
retaining health personnel in these areas, and (3) con­
trolling the quality and the cost of medical care. 
In 1978, the coal operators were successful in getting the 
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) to agree to a 
contract in which the Fund medical program was replaced 
by private insurance coverage on a company-by-com­
Pany basis for active coal miners and their families, theret;>y 
eliminating what for thirty years had stood out as an al-
ternative to the dominant mode of organizing and financ­
ing health care services in the United States. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to consider the entire thirty year 
history of the Fund medical program.* However, the first 
ten years of the program contain important lessons for 
anyone interested in the relationship between. who con­
trols the provision of health care services and the cost 
and quality of those services. The purpose of this article 
is to consider (1) the medical care situation in the coal 
fields prior to the establishment of the Fund, and (2) the 
changing methods and policies developed by the medical 
staff of the Fund to meet the health care needs of coal 
miners and their families during the period from 1947 to 
1957. 
The Establishment of the UMWA Welfare Fund 
The United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retire­
ment Fund was established in 1946 in an agreement 
reached between the UMWA and the federal government. 
On May 21, 1946, the federal government seized control 
of the mines in order to keep coal flowing into the industrial 
heartlands in the face of the failure of the coal operators 
and the UMWA to reach a collective bargaining agree­
ment. The Union demand, which the coal operators had 
refused to meet and for which the miners had gone on 
strike, was for the establishment of a welfare and retire­
ment fund financed by a royalty of five cents on each ton 
of coal produced. When the coal operators regained con­
trol of the mines, they could not easily undo what the 
federal government had sanctioned. But from 1947 to 
1950 they did everything in their power to obstruct the 
operation of the Fund. Finally, in 1950, the coal operators 
stopped fighting the Fund and allowed the Union to con­
trol it, in return for a UMWA agreement not to oppose the 
mechanization of the mines. The Fund medical program 
was born out of the conflict between coal operators and 
coal miners, and its history can only be understood in 
terms of this conflict. 
Medical Care In the Coal Fields Before the Fund: The 
Boone Report 
On May 17, 1947, Admiral Joel T. Boone submitted a 
report entitled A Medical Survey of the Bituminous Coal 
Industry, to J. A. Krug, the Secretary of the Department 
of the Interior (U.S. Department of Interior, 1947). Section 
five of the 1946 Krug-Lewis Agreement, which had es­
tablished the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund, stip­
ulated that such a survey be conducted. A team of Navy 
medical and technical people under Boone's direction 
examined housing, sanitation, water supply, industrial hy-
• This is the subject of "A History of the Medical Care Program of the United 
Mine WC!rkers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund," an unpublished 
thesis submitted by the author to the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and 
Public Health in partial fullfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master oi Science. 
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giene, medical and hospital care, and recreation at 260 
mines, or 14 percent of the mines under government cus­
tody. The report of this survey, which became known as 
the Boone Report, defined the initial task facing the Fund 
medical program. It identified characteristics of the coal 
industry and medical care in the coal fields which contin­
ued to be important throughout the history of the Fund 
medical program. 
Medical Care Plans 
At 60 percent of the 260 mines surveyed, employing 70 
percent of the miners, there was some form of pre-pay­
ment plan for general medical care. In most cases this 
was financed by a payroll deduction or "check-off" from 
the miner's wage which averaged from 75 cents to $3 per 
month for single miners, and from $1.20 to $3 per month 
for miners with families. The physician who received the 
check-off at a particular mine was usually selected by the 
coal operator. "Physicians were not selected primarily on 
the basis of professional qualifications and the character 
of the facilities and services that were offered, but on the 
basis of personal friendships, financial ties, social view­
points or other non-medical considerations," (U.S. De­
partment of the Interior, 1947, p. 123). 
The Boone Report revealed that although check-off phy­
sicians were being paid out of miners' wages to provide 
general medical care to miners and their families, they 
also provided valuable industrial medical services for the 
coal company, apparently in return for "the privilege of 
obtaining the payroll check-off of the miners" (U.S. De­
partment of the Interior, 1947, p. 1 09). These services 
included pre-employment physicals and treating miners 
injured in the mines. The Boone Report indicated that in 
treating industrial injuries "the company doctor submitted 
claims in only 21 percent of the cases treated, and that 
non-company physicians submitted claims in 89 percent 
of the cases treated," (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1947, p. 111). These findings suggest that the check-off 
system served an important non-medical function for the 
coal operators. It insured that the only physician available 
to coal miners was loyal to the company. The Boone Re­
port also found that many company doctors were relatively 
ignorant of industrial medicine and conditions in the mines. 
Through this system of medical care, coal companies 
could effectively deny the existence of occupational dis­
ease, downplay the extent of occupational injury, and not 
be held responsible for either. 
Miners' dissatisfaction with the check-off system was re­
flected in contract provisions in district agreements in 
eastern Kentucky (District 19) and in northern West Vir­
ginia (District 31 ). An August 1941 agreement in District 
31 provided for a joint union-management committee "to 
locally work out the type of service to be furnished by the 
doctor for the amount paid" and a procedure for handling 
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a doctor's failure to uphold the agreement. In April 1945, 
a provision of the District 19 contract established a joint 
committee to certify "candidates who aspire to become 
the camp physician" and stipulated that either the miners 
or the company had a right to call for the selection of a 
new company doctor if either party were dissatisfied w1th 
the existing doctor. (U.S. Department of Interior, 1947, p. 
126) 
Hospitalization Plans 
In most cases, miners pre-paid for hospitalization through 
a separate payroll deduction. The most serious problems 
with the hospitalization plans were their ambiguity as to 
the services and benefits covered and the number of 
exclusions. Hospitalizations for contagious diseases (ex­
cept for diagnosis of tuberculosis), venereal disease, mental 
illness, alcoholism, or "injuries related to intoxication or 
resulting from altercations and attempted suicide" were 
not covered. Since public health measures necessary for 
the control and prevention of contagious diseases were 
sorely lacking in these areas, the exclusion of hospitali­
zation for contagious diseases was inappropriate from a 
health standpoint. 
The most common complaints heard by members of the 
survey team were that there were insufficient numbers of 
physicians, hospitals, and nurses, and that "the costs to 
patients are not closely related to the actual cost of the 
medical care they receive." 
In concluding its discussion of hospital plans, the survey 
team stated, 
Medical security is a matter of paramount importance in the coal 
mining industry. Frequent periods of unemployment make it essential 
that provisions be made in all plans to extend credit to subscribers 
when they are not gainfully employed and to permit participants to 
receive benefits alter employment is terminated . . .  
U.S. Department of the Interior, 1947, p. 160. 
The Boone Report concluded: 
The present practices of medicine in the coal fields on a contract 
basis cannot be supported. They are synonymous with many abuses. 
They are undesirable and, in the numbers of instances, deplora­
ble . .. The investigators of the Survey group believe that a pre-pay­
ment system, with plans financed by wage deductions and predicated 
on a freedom of choice of physicians and hospitals by the benefici­
aries, would be best. Although payment of physicians is recom­
mended on both a fee-for-service basis and a salary basis, where 
necessary, the former method is emphasized because, under present 
custom, it offers by far the greater assurance of a freedom of choice 
of doctors by the patients. 
U.S. Department of the Interior, 1947, p. 164. 
When the Boone Report was issued in March 1947, it was 
immediately sent to the press and to the AMA. The f ind­
ings of the Boone Report made clear to the public and 
the medical profession that the demands of the miners 
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were justified and that something had to be done about 
the inadequacies and abuses associated with existing 
public health and medical care facilities and services in 
the coal fields. 
The UMWA Medical Program 
The Paraplegic Program 
John L. Lewis, the President of the UMWA from 1919 to 
1969 and the originator of the idea of a welfare fund fi­
nanced by a royalty on coal produced, felt the first priority 
of the Fund medical program should be the men who had 
suffered disabling injuries in the mines. Most of these men 
had never received proper medical care, and had lost 
hope that their situations could ever be improved. Coal 
mining exacted a human cost which the UMWA felt should 
be borne by the coal operators. The UMWA Welfare and 
Retirement Fund was established on the basic premise 
that: 
the provision for human equities in coal mining is as legitimate a cost 
of production as are the costs of maintenance and replacement of 
machinery, of power for haulage and tipples, of rails and equipment, 
of selling and overhead, and of the innumerable other cost items 
required to bring coal from its seams underground to the surface for 
marketing or use. 
UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund, 1951, p. 5. 
In 1948 it was estimated that there was a backlog or 
50,000 miners who had been disabled and were unable 
to work as a result of mine-related injuries or disease, and 
who had never received adequate medical care or re­
habilitation services. 
From late 1946 through 1948, the Fund medical program 
located and transported paraplegic and other severely 
disabled miners to treatment and rehabilitation centers in 
New York, New Jersey, and California. 
Rehabilitation continued to be an important aspect of the 
comprehensive medical care program which began in 
1949. However, the initial round-up of paraplegic miners 
was a dramatic, one-time event. As Dr. Lorin Kerr, then 
assistant to the executive medical officer of the Fund, 
stated: 
This transition from helpless, bedridden, literally rotting creatures to 
working men in wheelchairs and on crutches and artificial limbs is one 
of the most dramatic stories in medical history, and a monument to 
the physicians and institutions that undertook this seemingly hopeless 
task. 
Kerr, 1962. 
The Structure and Administration of the Medical Care 
Program 
By July 1949, the Fund had a central office in Washington 
D.C. and a regionalized system of ten area medical of­
fices. Each area medical office was headed by a physi­
cian and a non-physician medical administrator. The staffs 
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of the area medical offices also included public health 
nurses and rehabilitation specialists. The original tasks of 
each office were: (1) to make service and financial ar­
rangements with physicians and hospitals who had agreed 
to participate in the program; (2) to assist beneficiaries in 
receiving the benefits from public health agencies and 
programs to which they were entitled; and (3) to review 
bills from health care providers, and when appropriate, 
send them on to Washington for payment, usually within 
48 hours of when the bill was received. 
In practice, there were regional differences in the Fund 
medical program due to differences in: (1) The relative 
importance of coal mining and coal miners in the com­
munity; (2) the nature and concentration of physicians and 
hospitals and other health resources in the area; (3) the 
area medical administrator's perception of his role as a 
mediator between organized medicine and the miners, 
represented by district and local union officials; and (4) 
the health care concerns, the strength, and the militancy 
of the UMWA locals and districts within the jurisdiction of 
the area medical office. In other words, the actual admin­
istration of the Fund medical program and the implemen­
tation of its policies were determined by the interaction of 
objective conditions and the particular configuration of 
political forces in an area. 
The Comprehensive Medical Care Program 
The general medical care program was launched in early 
1949, while some of the area medical offices were still 
being set up. Initially everything was covered: aspirin, 
dental care, office visits, eye glasses, hospitalization. The 
Fund medical program 
assumed at the outset that every physician was competent in the field 
in which he claimed to be. We believed that if we permitted our benefi­
ciaries to choose any physician whom they wished, organized med­
icine at the national, state, and county levels would see to it that these 
physicians rendered services of high quality within their capabilities, 
and utilized specialist services at Fund expense when needed in the 
best interest of the patient. 
Draper, 1958, p. 6. 
The Fund sought to use existing hospitals and physicians 
as far as possible, but in some areas the availability and 
quality of hospital and physicians' services were inade­
quate. The Fund encouraged local general practitioners 
to refer Fund beneficiaries to specialists, and it estab­
lished a visiting consulting service which brought medical 
specialists from urban areas into the coal fields to consult 
with local general practitioners. However, many general 
practitioners were reluctant to make such referrals be­
cause of insecurity about their own medical knowledge 
and competence, and fear of losing patients. 
From its beginning, the Fund medical program actively 
enlisted the cooperation of coal field doctors and organ­
ized medicine at all levels. Dr. Draper, the Executive Med-
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ical Director of the Fund, was himself a long-standing 
member of the highest ranks of organized medicine. He 
believed that cooperation from physicians would be forth­
coming and spent much of his time and energy trying to 
obtain it. The Boone Report had emphasized that such 
cooperation was necessary if the health care problems in 
the coal fields were to be solved. 
The initial, completely open and total comprehensive-cov­
erage phase of the Fund medical program lasted from 
early 1949 to September 17, 1949, when everything came 
to a grinding halt. The UMWA and the coal operators were 
fighting for control of the production process and control 
of the Fund; eventually the operators refused to make 
royalty payments to the Fund. Without any income or re­
serves, the Fund was forced to halt benefits. 
The Fund ran out of money soon after royalty payments 
were stopped for several reasons. First, there was wide­
spread abuse of the program during its fully comprehen­
sive, uncontrolled phase. These abuses included, among 
other things, (1) unnecessary dental extractions and den­
tures and multiple sets of dentures, (2) doctors in eastern 
Kentucky hiring nurses and billing for their services as 
doctors' visits, and (3) the cost of a tonsillectomy jumping 
from $35 to $150 in 90 days. Second, in one area there 
was a tremendous backlog of unmet medical need among 
Fund beneficiaries. Third, financing primary care on a fee­
for-service basis was very expensive. 
When the Fund medical program was terminated on Sep­
tember 17, 1949, the Fund borrowed money from the Union 
so that it could continue to subsidize Fund beneficiaries 
who were already hospitalized and keep its field staff in 
place. Josephine Roche, the director and one of the trust­
ees of the Fund, vowed to try always to keep a one-year 
reserve on hand to avoid ever having to terminate the 
program again. Miners were out on strike over the Fund 
until March 1950, when George Love and John L. Lewis 
signed the historic 1950 agreement. This agreement in­
creased the royalty to the Fund, placed the Fund on a 
sound financial basis, and marked the beginning of a 
twenty year period of acceptance of the Fund by the op­
erators. 
The Fund Medical Program with Limitations and 
Controls 
In June 1950 the Fund medical program resumed, but 
with notable exclusions in coverage. No longer would the 
Fund cover home and office care and drugs other than 
those used in the hospital, or expensive drugs needed 
for chronic conditions. Hospitalization and physicians' 
services in the hospital were covered, but hospitalization 
for tonsillectomies and adenoidectomies, which in the ex­
perience of the Fund medical program had accounted for 
much of the unnecessary services and expenditures, now 
required prior authorization. The new program also ex-
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eluded: (1) Hospitalization for the care of mental illness 
after the diagnosis had been established; (2) services 
which the patient was able to receive from other agencies, 
voluntary or governmental; and (3) services which the 
employer or any other third party was legally obligated to 
provide. 
To forestall unnecessary hospitalization under this new 
system, out-patient services of a specialist were covered 
at Fund expense, provided that such service was au­
thorized in advance. However, out-patient service which 
was the counterpart of care usually provided by general 
practitioners in the home and office was not included. 
Physicians and hospitals with whom the Fund had not 
made specific arrangements were required to obtain prior 
authorization from the Fund before hospitalizing or per­
forming surgery on a Fund beneficiary. Thus the Fund 
could select providers with whom to make arrangements, 
and could terminate arrangements with providers who in 
its experience delivered poor-quality medical care. These 
providers were not completely excluded from receiving 
payment; they just had to obtain authorization ahead of 
time. 
Alternatives to Fee-for-Service Medicine 
At about the time the new program was launched, the 
medical staff began to experiment with other mechanisms 
for improving the availability and quality of medical care 
in the coal fields. The most important of these were the 
retainer method of payment and Fund support for the 
establishment of group practice clinics and a network of 
hospitals. These policies, and the administrative proce­
dures which followed from them were based upon two 
key perceptions of the Fund medical staff. The first was 
that both adequate facilities and an adequate guaranteed 
income were required in order to attract well trained med­
ical specialists to coal mining communities. The second 
was that the fee-for-service system was not the best way 
to organize and finance health care services. A member 
of the early Fund medical staff said, 
The reason we wanted to offset fee-for-service was we didn't feel it 
was a good way to pay for anything, including medical care . . .  What 
you get in medicine is a premium for surgery and for any other kind 
of care that you may give, and it makes it extremely difficult to control 
the cost of an overall delivery program. 
Daniels, 1979. 
The retainer method of payment (so called to avoid the 
anti-salary bias of the medical profession) was developed 
by the Fund medical program as an alternative to item­
ized, fee-for-service billing. 
The retainer system, or fee-for-time arrangement, was first 
developed with solo providers. The idea behind it was to 
remove the financial incentive for unnecessary services 
inherent in the fee-for-service arrangement. The retainer 
concept was then modified for use with clinics. Instead 
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of fee-for-time, clinics were paid a percentage of their 
operating costs equal to the percentage of Fund bene­
ficiaries in their patient load. 
The Fund's Support of Coal Field Clinics 
In the early 1950's, a number of consumer-sponsored, 
multi-specialty group practice clinics were established in 
the coal fields with the administrative and financial back­
ing of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund. The de­
velopment of these group practice clinics financed on a 
retainer basis by the Fund provided a means for miners 
and the Fund to avoid the expensive but poor-quality med­
ical care that had prevailed. Because the Fund did not 
pay for routine home and office care, general practitioners 
continued to receive a check-off to provide these services. 
These physicians often unnecessarily hospitalized Fund 
beneficiaries since, in the early 1950's, the Fund allowed 
any physician, including a general practitioner, to hos­
pitalize a Fund beneficiary at his or her own discretion, 
and then paid for the in-hospital physician services on a 
fee-for-service basis. Warren Draper described the re­
sulting problems for the Fund in this way: 
The number of patients hospitalized is larger, the length of stay is 
longer, and the costs are greater than is necessary. This is due in the 
main to the following factors: 
a. It is to the advantage of the check-off physician to save time and 
money by getting as many patients into the hospital as possible. 
b. It is to the advantage of the hospital to admit as many sure pay 
patients as possible and prolong their stay. 
c. Inadequacy of facilities available to the check-off physician makes 
it difficult or impossible tor him to care for cases which would not 
require hospitalization otherwise. 
d. No encouragement is afforded to younger and better qualified 
physicians to enter into competition and improve conditions of practice 
because of company control and lack of means to break the present 
system. 
Draper, May 25, 1953, p. 1. 
On the one hand, the Fund medical program had found 
that the existing home and office care in the coal fields 
was of poor quality and too expensive to pay for on a fee­
for-service basis. But on the other hand, when they stopped 
paying for home and office care, but continued to cover 
in-hospital physician services, they were faced with a high 
rate of unnecessary hospitalization. Part of the solution to 
this dilemma was the Fund's support for the establishment 
of group practice clinics on a retainer basis. 
Some members of the medical staff believed that this was 
a better way to practice medicine from the standpoint of 
both quality and economy. The Fund medical program 
had had problems with general practitioners not referring 
patients for specialists' services when medically indi­
cated, and hospitalizing and/operating on beneficiaries 
without sufficient diagnostic work-up and without the in­
volvement of specialists in their care. Group practice clin­
ics which had different specialists working as a team, with 
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laboratory and x-ray facilities all in one location, were 
viewed as a means of upgrading the quality of medical 
care in the coal fields. By helping to establish these clinics 
the Fund was able to attract well-trained physicians to 
coal mining communities. Such physicians would not have 
located in these areas if their income had depended on 
fees alone. 
Coal mining communities needed health care services. 
But they were relatively small, and the mines did not pro­
vide year-round employment. This meant that a physician 
who set up a practice on a fee-for-service basis would 
have little financial security. That is one of the reasons 
why coal companies established the check-off system 
and why, before the establishment of the Fund medical 
program, virtually all coal field doctors received some 
form of check-off. Market forces have never resulted in 
an adequate supply of medical personnel in rural areas. 
This problem has been faced by miners, the UMWA, and 
coal operators since the late nineteenth century, and by 
the Fund since its inception in· 1946. Fund support for 
consumer-sponsored group practice clinics was one ap­
proach to solving this problem. 
It was understood that the clinics were to obtain as much 
support for their operation as possible from other sources. 
However, it was impossible to collect from fee-for-service 
patients the true cost of the services rendered to them for 
the following reason: If these clinics were to serve the 
entire community and thus have sources of income be­
sides the Fund, they had to charge fee-paying patients 
the prevailing rates. But the prevailing rates for ambulatory 
care in the fee-for-service world were based on (1) more 
office visits per day, (2) a greater reliance on hospitali­
zation and surgery as a source of physician income, and 
(3) fewer ancillary services. At the same time, in order to 
attract physicians to practice in coal field clinics, salaries 
had to be competitive with what they could earn elsewhere 
on a fee-for-service basis. Because these clinics offered 
more comprehensive medical care than fee-for-service 
medicine, their cost per visit was sometimes higher. Yet 
their charges to fee-paying patients could not reflect this 
higher cost, or they would lose these patients. Some mem­
bers of the medical staff believed that salaried group 
practice was the best way of attracting well-qualified phy­
sicians to the coal fields and giving miners the best pos­
sible medical care. Therefore, they argued that the Fund 
should support the establishment of group practice clinics 
in isolated areas, regardless of a possibly higher cost per 
visit to the Fund. The alternative was that good quality 
medical services would continue to be inaccessible to 
Fund beneficiaries. 
Placing individual physicians on salary, and the medical 
group as a whole on a retainer, meant that the medical 
group could practice medicine free from worries about 
whether or how they were going to get paid. This allowed 
them to focus all of their attention on providing the best 
The Einstein Quarterly Journal of Biology and Medicine 
possible medical care. Physicians who wanted to be able 
to practice medicine in this way were attracted to Fund­
supported clinics. Dr. Milton Levine, a graduate of the 
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and one of the foun­
ders of the Bellaire Clinic in eastern Ohio, said: 
It's easy for any doctor to go into practice if he simply wants to rnake 
a living. But I want more from my medicine than that. I want to be 
able to practice in the way I was trained to practice it. I can do that 
in one of two settings-in a university or in a group where I have 
people of like mind, that is, people who want to practice university 
medicine. 
"Dr Sarns: Why He Can't Deliver Babies in Bellaire," 1963. 
And Dr. Birmingham, the Bellaire Medical Group's sur­
geon, said that surgeons in solo practice have "subtle 
financial pressures that are not present in this type of 
(group practice) set-up. I am completely free of any fi­
nancial influence as to whether a patient should have an 
operation or not .. .  I can go to sleep at night knowing I 
haven't done anything that wasn't medically indicated" 
{Ibid.). In a November 13, 1957 memorandum to Jose­
phine Roche, Or. Draper stated: 
The Bellaire Clinic is very important to our program because: (1) It is 
staffed and equipped to render the best quality of medical care in the 
surrounding area. The clinic physicians are the best qualified spe­
cialists on the staff of the Bellaire Hospital and (2) Specialist consul­
tation at the Clinic is required on all patients to determine whether or 
not hospitalization is essential. 
Draper, November 13, 1957. 
However, the medical staff's support for the retp.iner sys­
tem did not mean that the clinics had a blank check from 
the Fund. The Washington office of the Fund was very 
conscious of the fact that under the retainer method of 
payment, physicians had no economic incentive to pro­
vide an adequate volume of services for the amount of 
retainer being paid. So the Fund monitored the number 
of visits to determine whether physicians on retainers were 
providing enough services, rather than just receiving an 
assured income and controlling their days and their case 
load. 
In summary, consumer-sponsored group practice with 
physicians paid on a salary basis and with financial se­
curity provided by the Fund, not only attracted well-qual­
ified physicians who were committed to providing high­
quality medical care, but also made it possible for them 
to provide it. There was a spirit of cooperation between 
these "miners' clinics" and the Fund, based on a shared 
dedication to serving the miners and to practicing good­
quality medicine. The greatest obstacle to the widespread 
development of consumer-sponsored clinics was the ac­
tive opposition of local medical establishments. 
The Fund Medical Program and Organized Medicine 
The original assumption of the Fund medical program­
that every physician was competent in the field in which 
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he claimed to be-proved incorrect. Fund data indicated 
a poor quality of medical care (unnecessary hospitali­
zation, unnecessary surgery, and excessive lengths of 
stay) when Fund beneficiaries in a particular area were 
compared to other groups in the same area. Warren Draper 
gave the following examples: {1) In one coal mining pop­
ulation of 64,655, the hospitalization rate for a 2.25 year 
period (January 1, 1955 to April 1, 1957) was 317 per 
1000 for beneficiaries compared with 190 per 1 000 for an 
adjoining population; (2) in one county the rate of appen­
dectomies for Fund beneficiaries was 9 per 1000, while 
the rate for a smaller contiguous group was 5 per 1000. 
In the same area, Fund beneficiaries received cesarean 
sections at a rate of 11 per 100 deliveries, compared to 
a rate of 2 per 100 in the comparison population; (3) in a 
general hospital which had an average length of stay of 
8 days, a study of a series of 239 Fund beneficiaries who 
had surgery revealed an average length of stay of 21.3 
days (Draper, 1958, pp 7 -8). 
In 1952, when Draper and the area medical officers were 
becoming increasingly concerned over the quality of 
medical and hospital services available in some of the 
mine areas, Draper presented the problems the Fund 
medical program was facing to the AMA Council on Med­
ical Service. In response, the Council conducted a survey 
to verify the nature and extent of the medical care prob­
lems the Fund's medical staff had identified, and to de­
termine what, if anything, the AMA could do to help solve 
them. From 1952 to 1956, the AMA sponsored a series 
of conferences on coal field health care attended by rep­
resentatives of county medical societies and the Fund 
medical staff. At these conferences the conflicts between 
some practicing physicians and the Fund medical pro­
gram were aired, and the role of county medical societies 
in handling these disputes was discussed, but the prob­
lems were never resolved. 
Area medical administrators found that county and state 
medical societies were unwilling to censure their own 
members. One area medical administrator said that the 
reasons state medical societies were reluctant to take 
decisive action to correct "gross deviations from profes­
sional and ethical standards" were that (1) Medical prac­
tices in the territory in question, although not of high qual­
ity, were probably no worse than in other sections of the 
state; {2) Such action would question officially the quali­
fications of general practitioners to do all types of surgery; 
(3) Other groups would tend to take the same action; (4) 
Private patients might learn of the action and demand 
consultation (American Medical Association. 1953). 
Some representatives of the state and county medical 
societies acknowledged the problems and wanted to co­
operate with the Fund medical program. They took the 
position that "if we don't control ourselves, we're inviting 
control by others." However, the unnecessary hospitali­
zations, unnecessary surgery, unduly long lengths of stay, 
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and surgery performed by insufficiently qualified physi­
cians continued. 
To control these abuses, the Fund medical program in 
1955 instituted policies of requiring prior authorization of 
hospitalization by a qualified specialist, and of using "to 
the fullest possible extent the services of broadly com­
petent and responsible surgeons according to criteria es­
tablished by the American Board of Surgery and other 
agencies similarly qualified to pass judgment" (Draper, 
1955, pp. 3-4). This action came after more than three 
years of evidence that Fund beneficiaries were being hos­
pitalized and operated on unnecessarily, and after exten­
sive but unsuccessful efforts by Dr. Draper, the area med­
ical administrators, and some few members of state and 
county medical societies to get organized medicine to 
take responsibility for controlling the quality of medical 
care, instead of simply claiming sole right to do so. These 
policies were first implemented in the Denver area, where 
"the quality of medical care, hospital admission and length 
of stay were highly questionable" (Draper, 1958, p. 9). 
The resulting reductions in hospitalization and surgery are 
summarized in Table I. 
These policies were adopted in other areas as of Decem­
ber 30, 1954. Dr. Draper said, "Similar results were be­
ginning to show wh�n the American Medical Association 
House of Delegates passed a resolution disapproving our 
requirement for consultation on all patients prior to hos­
pital admission." These requirements resulted in "reduc­
tions of up to 75 percent in gynecological operations in 
some places, and in the reduction of the rate of hospital 
admissions from an average of 350 per 1 000 beneficiaries 
to 180 per 1000 beneficiaries in one of our areas" (Draper, 
1958, pp. 9-1 0). The Fund decided to avoid an open 
break with the AMA by dropping its requirement and look­
ing for another way to accomplish the same objective. 
Draper noted that the AMA did not object to the Fund's 
·refusal to pay individual physicians for servi�es of inferior 
quality as judged by qualified consultants, nor our un­
willingness to pay physicians whose qualifications for sur­
gery we are not in a position to judge, when Board or 
College surgeons are available." 
Table I. The Effect of Requiring Prior Authorization for Hospitalization and 
Surgery by Board-Certified Surgeons in the Denver Area. (Rates are: 
Number per 1000 Beneficiaries per Year). 
Percent 
Before After reduction 
Hospital Admission Rate 232.5 157.0 32.5 
Hospital Days 198.5 125.4 36.8 
Days per Case 8.6 8.0 7.0 
Rate for All Surgical 76.4 63.8 16.5 
Procedures 
Hemorrhoidectomies 2.9 1.9 34.5 
Appendectomies 6.9 2.8 59.4 
Gynecological 12.2 9.3 23.8 
Source: W.F. Draper, March 25, 1958. 
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Immediately after the Fund medical program withdrew its 
requirement for prior authorization of hospitalization, rep­
resentatives of the Fund began negotiating an agreement 
with the Committee on Medical Economics of the Penn­
sylvania State Medical Society. In November 1955 an 
agreement was reached and approved by the board of 
trustees of the Pennsylvania State Medical Society. The 
agreement included procedures for changes in Fund pol­
icies, Pennsylvania Medical Society endorsement of hos­
pital Medical Audit Committees, and the statement that 
"it is the duty of all physicians, including those employed 
by the Fund, to expose incompetent, corrupt, dishonest 
or unethical conduct on the part of members of the profes­
sion." It was further agreed that "organized medicine does 
not concede to a third party the prerogative of passing 
judgment on the treatment rendered by physicians, in­
cluding the necessity of hospitalization, length of stay, and 
the like. It is the responsibility of organized medicine to 
take the initiative in searching out abuses and instituting 
measures for their correction. The Medical Service of the 
Fund shall cooperate wholeheartedly in providing infor­
mation to the proper committees of Hospital Staffs and 
Liaison Committees at local and higher levels to aid in the 
solution of such difficulties." The Fund retained its pre­
rogative for consultation before or after hospital admission 
"for just cause such as recurrent admissions, repeated 
referrals, prolonged medical care, and excessive hospital 
stay," and supported the right of individual physicians to 
decide "the method of payment for his services without 
jeopardizing his relationship with the Fund" (American 
Medical Association Council on Medical Service, 1956). 
This landmark agreement was reached after five months 
of negotiations. However, on October 23, 1956, after it 
had been in effect less than ten months, a small group of 
physicians from Allegheny County who strongly opposed 
the Fund's support of a new group practice in their area, 
pushed through a resolution at the meeting of the House 
of Delegates of the Medical Society which declared this 
agreement "null and void, terminated and ended." No 
reasons were given or arguments presented supporting 
this action. When this occurred, the already strained re­
lations between the Fund medical program and organized 
medicine broke down completely. 
Free Choice of Physician 
The charge of physicians and medical societies through­
out the coal fields was that in adopting these policies, the 
Fund was "discriminating unfairly, and interfering with the 
patient's free choice of physician." Dr. Draper's response 
to this charge deserves special attention, since it calls 
into question their concept of "freedom" and argues that 
the Fund medical program had in fact increased its be­
neficiaries' freedom of choice. Draper made clear that 
freedom requires economic power and resources, and 
the opportunity to use them, both of which the Fund pro­
vided to people who did not have them before. "The term 
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'free choice of physician' has not been adequately de­
fined. It is subject, therefore, to almost any interpretation 
that an individual or group may wish to place upon it.· 
Draper then argued that the Fund had actually contributed 
to the free choice of physician, "provided the interpreta­
tion of the term is according to the rule of reason." Before 
the Fund, miners and their families in many areas had no 
choice but to receive medical care from the camp phy­
sician, who was employed by the company. "There were 
seldom any other physicians whom they could afford to 
pay within a distance they could travel. Unemployed and 
disabled miners without an income had no choice other 
than that of a physician who would accept them free of 
charge for such limited treatment as he could afford to 
offer." The Fund changed this situation. "Instead of one 
physician, the beneficiary now has a wide free choice 
from the many physicians whom the Fund pays for ser­
vices. More than 7,000 physicians were paid by the Fund 
during the past year" (Draper, 1960, p. 36). 
Some physician members of state and county medical 
societies charged that "industrial and labor health plans 
including our Fund are 'threatening socialized medicine 
by the back door' " (American Medical Association, Sep­
tember 1953, p. 20). In an article entitled "Compromise 
of Free Practice of Medicine," Dr. David Katz of Pittsburgh 
said that the Fund's sole aim was "a miniature socialization 
of medicine." Katz went on to warn, 
It is possible, with many similar socialized units, that they could and 
may combine forces. Their subscribers or beneficiaries may be legion, 
covering a large percentage of people in the United States. This would 
then be tantamount to privately controlled socialized medicine. Our 
path is clear cut. Do we want such controls? If so, then we can drift 
with the current and accept the rules of such plans. If on the other 
hand, we wish to continue the free practice of medicine on a fee-for­
service basis and free choice of physician, we must take exception 
to the rules of these plans and act accordingly. 
Katz, 1956, p. 1168. 
On January 1, 1957, the Illinois State Medical Society told 
its members that it "does not look with favor upon any 
member physician who includes the UMWA Welfare and 
Retirement Fund in negotiations for medical, surgical, and 
obstetrical care for any beneficiary of the Fund" (Bulletin 
of the Illinois State Medical Society, quoted in Draper, 
1957, p. 7). At the same time, it sent a telegram to UMWA 
officials in Illinois which stated the following: 
The doctors in your area have and will continue to care for your medical 
needs. After January 1, 1957 the doctor you choose (not one chosen 
by the Welfare Fund) will send you a bill for service. Your members 
can then send their bills to your Welfare Fund for whatever payment 
the Fund wants to make to the members, not to the doctor. Your 
doctors feel that this will be less trouble for everybody this way. 
Draper, 1957, p. 8. 
Illinois was not the only state in which medical societies 
urged their members to break off relations with the Fund 
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medical program. On January 9, 1957, Dr. Draper ap­
pealed to the AMA Committee on Medical Care for In­
dustrial Workers. He pointed out that the Illinois State Med­
ical Society had not used established procedures which 
might have allowed the problems to be resolved "through 
calm and judicial consideration by a body of organized 
medicine specifically designed for that purpose." This fail­
ure to use proper channels had caused "undesirable pub­
licity, . . . rifts and antagonisms among various elements 
of the medical profession and its individual mem-
bers . . .  serious financial embarrassment to hospitals, 
and . . inconvenience and hardship to hundreds of pa-
tients" (Draper, 1957, p. 8). Draper appealed to the Com­
mittee to "offer its good offices" to the resolution of the 
situation. 
The outcome of this dispute marked the end of ten years 
of effort by the Fund medical program to work through 
the established channels of organized medicine. In the 
spring of 1957, representatives of the medical societies 
of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Colorado met with the Com­
mittee on Medical Care for Industrial Workers of the AMA 
to draft guidelines for relationships between state and 
county medical societies and the Fund. On the objection 
of one medical society representative, Draper was not 
permitted to participate in the formulation of these guide­
lines. Even though Draper "informed the Reference Com­
mittee that the Guides were not acceptable in their present 
form and would not be followed if adopted," they were 
still submitted to and approved by the AMA House of 
Delegates the following day, June 6, 1957. These "Sug­
gested Guides" asked the Fund to assume what it initially 
had assumed but then found to be incorrect: "Every phy­
sician duly licensed by the state to practice medicine and 
surgery should be assumed at the outset to be competent 
in the field in which he claims to be, unless considered 
otherwise by his peers." Dr. Draper said, "This would place 
us back where we were ten years ago with a repetition of 
all the evils we have suffered in between" (Draper, 1958, 
p. 10). 
As a result of this stalemate with organized medicine, in 
October 1957 the Fund instituted a policy of "limiting its 
payments to physicians and hospitals whose services are 
necessary and essential in providing the hospital and 
medical care benefits which it (The Fund) has authorized" 
(Draper, 1958, p. 10). Each area medical office was di­
rected to develop a list of participating physicians and 
hospitals. These lists were to include those physicians 
and hospitals which, in the experience of the Fund med­
ical program, had (1) provided good-quality medical care, 
(2) charged reasonable fees, (3) seen a sufficient number 
of beneficiaries to be familiar with the services provided 
by the Fund medical program ard its procedures, and (4) 
expressed a willingness to cooperate with Fund proce­
dures. 
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Conclusions 
several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of 
medical care in the coal fields before the Fund and during 
the first ten years of the Fund medical program. First, 
miners' experience with the company doctor system in­
dicates the potential for abuse when employers control 
the provision of medical care to their employees. Second, 
the Fund medical program stands in sharp distinction to 
health insurance companies which historically have sim­
ply processed bills, neither intervening in the medical care 
market nor acting as health care advocate for their be­
neficiaries. Thus, the early history of the Fund medical 
program provides evidence that alternatives to the dom­
inant mode of organizing and financing medical care in 
this country have existed and therefore can exist. This 
history has shown, however, that the provision of health 
services is an object of conflict and struggle between 
groups with different interests-between workers and em­
ployers, between recipients of services and providers of 
services, and between one group of providers and an­
other group of providers. This implies that those who are 
interested in the provision of good quality health care to 
the majority of Americans who cannot by their own eco­
nomic and political power secure it for themselves, will 
necessarily be involved in conflict and struggle to achieve 
that goal. 
The history of the Fund medical program provides one 
example of the ongoing resistance of organized medicine 
to any outside control of physician practices. While this 
resistance serves the financial interests of some physi­
cians, the experience of the Fund medical program leads 
one to question whether it is in the best interests of pa­
tients. It is important to recognize that the Fund medical 
program did not start out with strict policies to control 
physician practices. Instead, it began with the assumption 
that every physician was competent in the field in which 
he claimed to be; it implemented more restrictive policies 
only in the face of continual, bitter experience and its failed 
efforts at negotiating with organized medicine. This ex­
perience of the Fund medical program seems to suggest 
the desirability of external controls on physicians and of 
alternatives to the fee-for-service system when high qual­
ity medical care at a reasonable cost is the goal. 
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